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SUPREMECOURTOFTHEUNITEDSTATES
EARL ALLEN v. STEPHEN L. HARDY ET AL.
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 85-6593.

Decided June-, 1986

dissenting.
On all too many occasions in recent years, I have felt
compelled to e>..-press my dissatisfaction with this Court's
readiness to dispose summarily of petitions for certiorari on
the merits without affording the parties prior notice or an
opportunity to file briefs. See, e. g., City of Los Angeles v.
Heller, 475 U. S. - -, - - (1986) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting); Cuyahoga Valley R. Co. v. Transportation Union, 474
U. S. - -, - - (1985) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting); Maggio
v. Fulford, 462 U. S. 111, 120-121 (1983) (MARSHALL, J.,
dissenting). "[B]y deciding cases summarily, without benefit of oral argument and full briefing, and often with only
limited access to, and review of, the record, this Court runs a
great risk of rendering erroneous or ill-advised decisions that
may confuse the lower courts: there is no reason to believe
that this Court is immune from making mistakes, particularly
under these kinds of circumstances." Hm-ris v. Rive·ta, 454
U. 8. 339, 349 (1981) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting).
The circumstances are even less propitious in this case.
Generally when this Court summarily disposes of a petition
for certiorari, we have at least benefited from the tendency of
both petitioners and respondents to focus excessively on the
merits of the question they ask the Court to consider. Here,
because the petition was filed prior to our decision in Batson
v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. - - (1986), petitioner never had the
opportunity to address whether that decision should be applied retroactively to those seeking collateral review of their
convictions, and respondent chose to devote but a single sentence to the issue. In addition, that issue has not been adJUSTICE MARSHALL,
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~uracy of a trial :>hould be• a <"ritical c•mcc..:rn in any mquiry
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cases pcndmg on collateral revic.!w; indef'fJ, r think that f:-v·lcJr
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Se(! wl:llutrrui v. rhulr~rl
~tales, 401 U. S. ()4f.i, fjfjf) (l!J7 1) (MARSHALL, .J., concurring
m part and dissenting in part). How8ver, r arn not at all
persuaded by the majority's Cfmclusicm that the rule announced in Bat.•wn Jacks 11Such a fundamental impaet rm the
integrity of factfinding as to c()mpel retroactive applicati(m,''
ante, at 4. The Court is surely correct to nrJte that the ruiP
"serves other values" besides accurate factfinding. Ibid..
"The effect of excluding minorities gcJf.m bey(Jnd the individual
defendant, for such exclusion produces 1injury to the jury
system, to the Jaw as an institution, to the community at
large, and to the democratiC' ideal n~flf~Cted in the prc>cesscs
of our courts."' McCray v. New York, 4f>1 U. S. !Jfil., !J68
(1983) (MARSHALL, .} . , dissenting from d eni~1l of certiorari).
A rule that targets sueh discriminatory practices will thus
J
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provide redress to citiums unconstituti()Clally struck from
jury panels. That criminal defendants will not be the only
beneficiaries of the rule, hrJwever, should hardly diminish our
assessment of the rule's impact upon the ability of defendants
to receive a fair and accurate trial. Moreover, I do not s hare
the majority's confidence that "other procedures" in place
prior to our decision in Batson "creat[e] a high probability

that the individual jurrJrs seated in a particular case were
free from bia.~,'' anl11, at 4. When the prosecution uncon·
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stitutionally uses its
and Hispanics from t:e~emptory sti·ikes to remove blacks
process is not cured b e Jury' the thr_eat to the truth finding
that white .
Y. measures clestgned merely to ensure
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permitted
to serve satisfy the legal stanclard 10r tmpartiahty.
"Wh
. ~n any large and identifiable segment of the commuruty IS ex~luded form jury service, the effect is to remove
?-om the JUry room qualities of human nature and varietIes of human experience, the range of which is unknown
and perhaps unknowable. It is not necessary to assume
that the excluded group will consistently vote as a class
in order to conclude ... that its exclusion deprives the
jury of a perspective on human events that may have unsuspected importance in any case that may be presented." Peters v. Kiff, 407 U. S. 49:3, 508-504 (1972)
(opinion of MARSHALL, ,J .).
Certainly, one need not assume that the exclusion of any distinctive group from the venire will affect the integrity of the
factfinding process to believe, as I do, that where the prosecution uses its peremptory challenges to cull black and Hispanic jurors from the jury empaneled for the trial of a black
defendant, the threat to the accuracy of the trial is significant
and unacceptable. See Batson, supra, at--, n. 8 ("For a
jury to perform its intended function as a check on official
power, it must be a body drawn from the community").
The other considerations that the Court fincls to counsel
against retroactivity here are similarly unpcrsuasive. While
Bat:~fm overruled Swain v. Alabam.n, :380 U. S. 202 (1965) by
changing the burden of proof imposecl upon both defendants
and prosecutors, ante, at 5, the Court seriously overestimates the "reliance interest of law enforcement officials" in
the old regime. This is not a case in which primary conduct
by such officials was permitted by one decision of this Court
and then prohibited by another. Swain made quite clear
that the use of peremptory challenges to strike black jurors
on account of their race violated the Equal Protection Clause.
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It s ould at least give some
tho.u~ht as to whether that t·eliance should be deemed
legitimate.
Finally, the Court observes that "retl·oactive application of
the Batson rule on collateral review of final convictions would
seriously disrupt the administration of justice." Ante, at 5.
Perhaps this is true; perhaps it is not. Certainly, the papers
before us in this case allow us no basis for making any estimate of how many defendants pursuing federal habeas relief
have preserved a Batson claim in the State courts. In this
inquiry, perhaps more than in any other aspect of the case,
the need for further briefing, and perhaps the participation of
interested amici, is compelling, and the majority's readiness
to act on its own uninformed assumptions, disturbing.
I would grant the petition for certiorari and set the case for
briefing on the merits and oral argument next Term.

